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ABSTRACT 
 
A Survey on Potential Privacy Leaks of GPS Information in 
Android Applications 
By 
Srinivas Kalyan Yellanki 
Dr. Ju-Yeon Jo, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Android-based smart phones are extremely common today. However, it is 
believed that nearly half of the Android devices are vulnerable to an attack that 
alters the functionality of an app with malicious software. The malware can collect 
users sensitive data from the phone. In particular, there are hundreds of location-
based applications available nowadays in the Google Play store or other app 
stores. The very famous services called ―Location Based Services‖ are used by 
many apps on mobile phones to track the geographical coordinates of the device. 
Such location information can be leaked to an attacker via malware.  
In this thesis, we discuss different ways in which privacy can be breached 
in android applications and their countermeasures. The vulnerabilities, the method 
of detecting the information leakage, and the measures to control the security 
breach are discussed. The experimental results show how effectively those 
different countermeasures can help us in preventing the security breaches and 
information leakage of GPS data in android applications. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is very common today that everyone is using smartphones. There are many 
location-based applications available now days in the play store or App store. The 
very famous services called ―Location Based Services‖ are used by many 
applications to track the geographical coordinates of the device. The usage of this 
service is growing fast in the android applications.  
 
1.1 Android History 
In current mobile market, android is the most widely used operating system on 
smartphones. The android version history of the android operating system has 
begun with the release of the Android beta in November 2007 and then the first 
commercial version, Android 1.0, was released in September 2008[1]. Android is 
taken up by Google and currently is under ongoing development by Google and 
the Open Handset Alliance (OHA). 
The most recent major Android release in operating system was Android 5.0 
"Lollipop", which was released on November 3, 2014 by Google. Since April 
2009, the nomenclature of Android versions have been developed under 
a confectionery-themed and released in an alphabetical order, beginning with 
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Android 1.5 "Cupcake"; the earlier versions 1.0 and 1.1 were not released under 
specific code names: 
 Alpha (1.0) 
 Beta (1.1) 
 Cupcake (1.5) 
 Donut (1.6) 
 Eclair (2.0–2.1) 
 Froyo (2.2–2.2.3) 
 Gingerbread (2.3–2.3.7) 
 Honeycomb (3.0–3.2.6) 
 Ice Cream Sandwich (4.0–4.0.4) 
 Jelly Bean (4.1–4.3.1) 
 KitKat (4.4–4.4.4, 4.4W–4.4W.2) 
 Lollipop (5.0–5.1) 
Google announced that more than one billion activated Android devices were in 
use worldwide[2] on September 03, 2013 by the users. Recently in January 2015, 
Android devices accounted for approximately 62% of the US smartphone and 
tablet market. 
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1.2 Pre-Commercial Release Versions  
The actual development of Android was started in 2003 by Android, Inc.,and later 
was purchased by Google in 2005[3]. 
 
1.2.1 Alpha version 
There were at least two internal releases of the software inside Google and the 
OHA before the beta version was released in November 2007 as per sources. For 
the milestones in internal releases, names of fictional robots were chosen, with 
various releases code-named Astro Boy, Bender and R2-D2 [4][5][6]. 
Dan Morrill created some of the first mascot logos, but the current green Android 
logo was designed by Irina Blok[7]. The project manager, Ryan Gibson, conceived 
the confectionary-themed naming scheme that has been used for the majority of 
the public releases, starting with Android 1.5 "Cupcake". 
 
1.2.2 Beta version 
The beta version was released on November 5, 2007[8][9], while the software 
development kit (SDK) was released on November 12, 2007[10]. The November 5 
date is popularly celebrated as Android's "birthday"[11]. Public beta versions of 
the SDK were released in the following order[12]:  
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 November 12, 2007: m3-rc20a (milestone 3, release code 20a)
[13]
  
 November 16, 2007: m3-rc22a (milestone 3, release code 22a)
[14]
  
 December 14, 2007: m3-rc37a (milestone 3, release code 37a)
[15]
  
 February 13, 2008: m5-rc14 (milestone 5, release code 14)
[16]
  
 March 3, 2008: m5-rc15 (milestone 5, release code 15)
[12]
  
 August 18, 2008: 0.9
[17][18]
 
 September 23, 2008: 1.0-r1
[19][20]
   
 
1.3 Outline 
In this survey, we discuss the different ways in which privacy can be breached in 
android applications. The few issues are: 
  
1. Detection of GPS information leakage 
2. Vulnerabilities 
3. Privacy issues 
4. Measures to control the leakage and security breach 
 
The survey covers everything right from creation of an android application in an 
effective manner in order to prevent the security issues among the applications and 
then architecture of a typical android application then discusses the privacy issues 
in modern android applications followed by solutions to prevent the security 
breach.  
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This survey includes extensive experiments results that how effective different 
measures help us in preventing the detection of security breaches and leakage of 
GPS data in android applications with a high accuracy rate. 
 
At last, we categorize the detection results in our survey and provide the best 
solution that provides the minimal leakage of GPS data in an android application.  
 
1.4 Motivation  
Almost nearly half of the Android devices are vulnerable to an attack that could 
replace app functionality with malicious software that can steal and gather 
sensitive personal data from a phone.  
 
Major android developer giants like Google, Samsung and Amazon have released 
patches for their own devices, but 49.5 percent of Android users are still 
vulnerable according to Palo Alto Networks[21], which suffered the problem. 
Google said it has not detected attempts to exploit the flaw. 
 An infected application can be installed using the vulnerability, called "Android 
Installer Hijacking‖. This will have full access to a device, including personal 
sensitive data such as usernames and passwords, wrote Zhi Xu, a senior staff 
engineer with Palo Alto. 
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The vulnerability only affects apps that are installed from a third-party play store 
or websites. It is highly recommended to be more cautious while downloading 
such apps from third party websites.  
 
The apps that are downloaded from third party websites place their APK 
installation files in a device's unprotected or unmonitored local storage, such as an 
SD card.  
 
From these places, a system application called PackageInstaller finishes the 
installation. The flaw allows an APK file to be modified or replaced which may be 
malicious, during installation without anyone knowing. 
 
1.5 Attacking Procedure 
Install and attack flow would be like this: User downloads an app what appears to 
be a legitimate application from the third party website or app store. The 
application after downloading and before installation asks for certain permissions 
on the device.  
 
During that process, it was possible to swap or alter the APK file in the 
background because the PackageInstaller fails to verify it.After the user clicks the 
install button, the PackageInstaller can actually install a different malicious app 
with an entirely different set of permissions. 
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The main problem with the Android devices does not need to be rooted for the 
attack to work or to inject a malware, although rooting also make devices more 
vulnerable. 
  
When the major flaw was detected, in January 2014, approximately 90 percent of 
all Android devices were affected. That has since dropped to 49.5 percent, but still 
many devices have not been patched. 
The recent Palo Alto's exploit was a huge success against Android versions 2.3, 
4.0.3 to 4.0.4, 4.1.x, and 4.2.x. The 4.4 version of Android devices fixes the issue 
and some Android 4.3 devices may still be affected and since some manufacturers 
have not patched yet. 
In order to overcome these Malwares, Google has published a patch, and Amazon 
recommends its users to download the latest version of the Amazon AppStore, so 
that they update their Fire devices. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ANDROID ARCHITECTURE 
 
2.1 Android Security Architecture 
Android is the most modern mobile platform designed and is open in the market. 
All the android applications use the most advanced hardware and software to offer 
variety of innovative features that value to customers. In order to protect that 
value, the coding platform must provide an application environment that provides 
the security for users, data and applications on device. 
 
In order to secure the open platform, it requires a strong security and rigorous 
security programs. This can be achieved by android by adopting the multi-layered 
security and also provides protection for all the users using the platform. Android 
security system is designed with device users in mind. 
 
 This design includes the expectation that malicious app attackers would try to 
perform attacks such as social engineering attacks[1] to make users to install 
malware. The android security system is designed to reduce the both chances of 
these attacks and to limit the impact of attack on any app. 
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2.2 System and Kernel Security 
At the operating system level, android comprises Linux kernel and secure inter-
process communication (IPC). Android provides security to these two major 
components to achieve secure and safe communication between apps running in 
different processes. These security features at the Operating System level make 
sure that even the code is severely restricted by the Application Sandbox. 
The fig.1 below shows the Android Software Stack with bottom up approach 
depicting various levels of Android development. 
 
 
Fig 1. Android Software Stack[40] 
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2.3 Application Security in Android 
Android core operating system is completely based on the Linux kernel. The most 
android applications are programmed in Java programming language and run in 
the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM).  All the android applications are installed 
from a single file with the .apk extension.  
The android application building blocks are:  
 
 AndroidManifest.xml: The AndroidManifest.xml file is the metadata file 
that is considered as control file that tells the system, what to do with all 
top-level components in an application. This file specifies what all 
permissions are granted to the app. 
 Activites: An Activity is usually includes displaying a UI to the user and 
typically application‘s Activities is the entry point to an application. 
 Services: Services are the body or execution part of code that runs in the 
background. The other components ―bind‖ to a Service and trigger methods 
on it via remote procedure calls.  
 Broadcast Receiver: A BroadcastReceiver is an object that is instantiated 
when intent is issued by the operating system. An app may register a 
receiver for the low battery message and change its behavior based on that 
specific-information.  
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Security features are to be considered while developing Android applications to 
lessen the security breach. This can be achieved by encrypting the file system so 
that it keeps device safe during any theft or loss. This can be achieved by a 
concept called ―SandBox‖. 
 
2.4 Sandbox 
This Sandbox technique[26] helps users to isolate the app data and codes from the 
other applications on the device. So that developers can define their own 
permissions that are specific to their own applications. 
 
Due to this isolation of application data and codes with the other applications, the 
scope of influencing malicious applications is very less. This Sandbox isolates 
apps data and code accessing from other apps on the device so that it can prevent 
any vulnerabilities of malicious attempts by other apps. 
 
 But in real scenario, there is a necessity of accessing Phone book or Photo Gallery 
from the messenger applications on the device by which there is a large scope for 
malicious apps to attack the applications data or code. 
12 
 
 
                         Fig 2: Sandbox Manager[26] 
 
The above figure.2 depicts the overall architecture of the Android Sandbox 
Manager. To overcome this, an API called ContentProvider is responsible for 
authenticating and managing accesses to the databases of other apps. Permissions 
and ContentProvider are described in further detail in the following section.  
For any unusual or malicious activity detection; knowledge of application‘s 
characteristics is essential. There are two most common and best practices that 
exists in mobile software for analyzing the application‘s activity. They are ―Static 
and Dynamic analysis of software”. 
These two techniques have many advantages and disadvantages in terms of their 
evaluation. Static analysis involves various binary forensic techniques, including 
decompilation, decryption, pattern-matching and static system call analysis. 
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Functionality 
The main functionality of these techniques is to prevent running the potentially 
malicious software on the devices. The Static Analysis usually filters the binaries 
with malicious patterns, known as Signatures.  
               
                                   Fig.3 AASandbox Architecture[26] 
 
The above fig.3 shows the architecture of Sandbox with both the Static and 
Dynamic Analysis. Due to the direct comparison with the predefined signatures, 
the static analysis is very fast and simple.  
Almost all the anti-virus software are based on this approach. Difficulty with the 
Static Analysis is that each and every signature/malicious pattern must be known 
in advance during the analysis. By which it is impossible to detect new malware or 
malicious code entry from any external malicious application. 
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2.5 Droidbox 
We dedicate this section to a detailed description of Droidbox[24] and its 
capabilities. DroidBox[25] is a dynamic analysis tool for Android applications 
targeting Android version 2.1.  
The tool is based on TaintDroid[74] for detecting information leaks but has been 
extended, by modifying the Android framework, to monitor API calls of interest 
invoked by an application.  
Applications are executed within the Android SDK emulator and logs are issued 
for each monitored behavior and collected in the host operating system. A text-
based report is generated after analysis has ended and provides a summary of the 
execution.  
On mobile phones, malware has been discovered that listens for incoming SMS 
and forwards this information to the attacker. In, TaintDroid was used to track 
sensitive data originating from the phone‘s database.  
DroidBox can extend this approach by adding and modifying output channels 
throughout the Android framework to detect leaks via outgoing SMS and to 
disclose full details of the network communication, not only in network leak 
scenarios.  
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The file AndroidManifest.xml, included in the Android package, contains 
permissions that are needed for the application to interact with the operating 
system, for example, connecting to the Internet, sending SMS, making calls and 
receiving incoming SMS.  
Applications that need to interact with any resources must declare the appropriate 
permission in the manifest file. It has been demonstrated that malicious Android 
applications can circumvent the permission policies and [23], thus DroidBox 
compares each monitored operation that requires any permission with the 
package‘s manifest file to check if any permission policy has been bypassed. 
Some malicious Android applications can evade anti-virus software by performing 
obfuscation and changing themselves during run-time [27]. Obfuscation may 
include cryptographic functions applied to the data. DroidBox is designed to detect 
applications as they invoke cryptographic keys or perform encryption or 
decryption on the data  
Malicious Android applications can perform phone calls or send SMS to premium 
rate numbers that are declared by the attacker.  
 
16 
 
 
Fig 4. An Example of Behavioral Graph[24] 
 
The above figure shows the behavior graph produced by Droidbox describes the 
temporal order of the operations. DroidBox can disclose these operations by 
listening to API calls when SMS and calling methods are invoked by a sample.  
Figure 4 shows the output of the sample doodle.apk that was executed for 60 
seconds. On the x- axis the time of the monitored operation is shown, while the y-
axis describes what kind of operation type was monitored. This graph is generated 
by picking operations and timestamps for each operation from the sandbox log and 
plotting them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
VULNERABILITIES 
 
Vulnerabilities of Data Leakage in Android Applications 
Apps on android devices are highly vulnerable for data leakages because the 
android platform is open for developers and the android security allows users to 
download apps from third party websites or app stores. Therefore data leakage 
from android apps is very common and has high scope for stealing the personal 
sensitive data on phone.  
Data leakage in android applications can be done in many ways. Few ways are 
listed below in detail[55]. 
3.1 Data leak through the Android App Structure 
Personal sensitive data leakage in android application is done mainly through the 
app structure. An android app is undergoes many steps during the development 
[28]. Different ways in which data leakage occurs is discussed in following 
sections: 
3.1.1 ContentProvider and Permission 
 
There are many applications[29] installed on a device and each application knows 
the structure and file system of other applications and also knows how to interact 
18 
 
and access to the databases of other applications. 
 
 In order to grant access/permissions to the other applications databases, android 
interleaves ContentProviders[30], which is based on client-server model. So not all 
the applications cannot access the databases of other applications until permission 
is acquired from ContentProviders. 
There are some applications that run on server. These applications also require 
databases to access the content. So with the help of ContentProviders, apps that 
run on server share their content to other applications on the device.  
The server applications provide a unique URI to identify their database and 
specify these URI in AndroidManifest.xml or ContentProvider file. The 
applications that are so called client applications make use of these URI by 
making requests to send queries to a particular database of a server app.  
So, the client apps in order to use the server-side databases it should know the 
names, table structures and URI of the database. Unlike ContentProviders at 
server-side there are ContentResolvers at client-side.  
19 
 
                
                               Fig 5: Database Sharing between apps[29] 
 
The figure 5 explains how apps on android devices share resources like database. 
These ContentResolvers are used by client apps to communicate with the server-
side ContentProvider. Queries and URIs are sent to server-side ContentProvider 
using these ContentResolvers. 
These ContentProviders and ContentResolvers serve as intermediate for sharing 
databases between server and client apps. When these ContentResolver sends 
queries to the ContentProvider at server-side, the ContentProvider receives results 
from the database via DB Helper and send these results back to the 
ContentResolvers.  
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In order to access major resources or system functions, all the android applications 
see permission through the AndroidManifest.xml file[31] which is a unique file 
that holds all the permissions of Android System.  
 
Fig 6: Relationship between apps and permissions[29] 
 
The figure 6 explains the relationship between apps on android devices and how 
the permissions are granted. Now the applications that run on client side send 
query requests to ContentProvider through the ContentResolver to access the 
database on server.  
This Android System checks for the permissions required to access or to use the 
database by client apps. The service from a particular database may be denied or 
granted depending upon the permission levels for a particular client request. 
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3.1.2 Leakage of Data through Reverse Engineering  
In order to access the databases of other applications, the assigned URIs to every 
database are used, queries that require data tables and information of fields 
attributes and finally permissions required by server apps are needed.  
The address books database, it is provided as default to share within the apps. In 
this case not only URIs but also the access procedures or functions are also offered 
via System APIs. Data leakage in android apps through Reverse Engineering can 
be done in 3 different ways:  
a) Using Dedexer Tool 
The Java source files are converted into dex files while building an app in android. 
Dedexer is a tool that compiles dex files into Java source files. This is nothing but 
reverse compiling the files.  
While developing an Android app, the Java source code is compiled (.java) to 
(.class) files, which are called as byte code based on JVM (Java Virtual Machine). 
These (.class) files are then converted into a dex type file using Dedexer tool.  
The simulator that runs apps on Android devices is called Dalvik[32], which 
reads the byte codes of this dex file. All together the dex files, xml files and 
resources grouped together and compressed into Java archive (jar file) format and 
finally to generate an apk file (.apk).  
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There is one more important file named R.Java, which is a system generated 
resources file during the creation of app. 
 
Fig 7: Conversion of Android app files[29] 
 
The figure 7 explains the coversion of android apps files in an android device. 
This Dedexer reconfigures not only user written Java source programs but also 
R.Java. Still Dedexer doesn‘t completely restore all the files through reverse 
engineering process. 
 
b) Data Leakage through Apk Manager 
Dedexer may be accounted as one of the best tool for attackers to manipulate the 
Java source file through reverse engineering the dex files into Java Source files.  
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As mentioned earlier, the Dedexer does not support a complete restoration. And 
also, it restores Java programs only without supporting xml files and resources. 
That is the reason it is difficult to complete operable apps by analyzing the 
existing apps and turning them into malicious codes.  
But this ApkManager reverses and compiles original Java programs into Smali-
based[33] ones, which not only read just source programs but also 
AndroidManifest.xml.  
         
        Fig 8: Reverse Engineering through Apk Manager[29] 
The above figure 8 explains how the data leakage is done through the Reverse 
Engineering using the Apk Manager. 
c) Proguard 
Android system provides a feature called Proguard. This Proguard is used to 
prevent the reverse-engineered result[34] from being used for malicious codes or 
malware susceptible codes that influence the app.  
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On including the proguard.cfg file in the Android project can use this feature. This 
Proguard deletes the less important codes to optimize and reduce program volume, 
changes class names, fields and classes into meaningless ones for vagueness.  
Even though it takes some time to determine the meaning and context of changed 
names when vague sources are restored by reverse engineering, the analysis is 
definitely not impossible, as logics are not changed, which are the limitation of 
vagueness. 
3.2 Vulnerabilities of Data Leakage in Android GPS applications  
Many apps on the device use the GPS[57] information for navigation. But before 
requesting and getting the information it needs to get the access permissions from 
the user. After too many studies, we discovered that vulnerable apps generally 
acquire the user‘s private data at first and then sent them through network or SMS. 
Malicious applications are classified into two types[35]:  
 Request only 
Location Information 
Request extra 
Information 
Send information 
via Network 
Low risk High risk 
Send information 
via SMS 
High risk Low risk 
 
Table 1: Malicious applications classification[35] 
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The above table 1 defines the classification of malicious applications. We define 
the data leaks that contain only GPS information as low-level risk behavior and 
the data leaks that contain more private information as high-level risk behavior.  
Based on the triggering condition of the leaking behavior, we categorize the 
privacy leaking behavior into three types.  
1. The behavior triggered by user interaction with the application.  
2. The behavior triggered automatically by background services.  
3. The behavior triggered automatically by background services and user 
Interaction.  
The risk of leak triggered by background services on a device is only considered to 
be superior to other behaviors[35]. There are few papers that are manually 
analyzed on android malicious applications and noticed that most malicious 
applications are risky in behavior that mainly focus on collecting and sending the 
users private information.  
For example, FakeFlash is an Android Malware in the disguise of an Abode flash 
player application that collects user‘s phone number and phone‘s IMEI 
information and then send this data by posting information to remote server[58]. 
So a complete path from getting privacy data to sending privacy data should be 
included in a complete attack model. 
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In the below figure, we define the following specific behaviors as the potential 
privacy leaks of Android application.  
1. Collect user‘s private information using android framework API.  
2. Transform private information into another form.  
3. Send the transformed information to remote phone or remote server.  
 
 
Fig 9: Potential Privacy Leaks of Android Application[35] 
 
 
The above figure 9 explains the potential privacy leaks of android applications. In 
the attack model, we define Entry block as the triggering action, which then leads 
to privacy data leak, Sources block as the action, which collects sensitive 
information, sinks block as Privacy sending action.  
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A path that is connecting a source and a sink is considered as a Confirmed path. 
There is a leakage detection called ―Brox‖ which detects location leakage 
information.  
This tool is based on Dalvik-opcode[36] specification and uses data flow analysis 
framework equipped with context-sensitive, flow-sensitive and inter-procedure 
techniques to detect potential location information leakage path in Android 
malicious apps.  
This Brox is also a static privacy leak detection framework for Android apps. Got 
inspired by WALA[56], that provides static analysis capabilities for Java byte-
code, JavaScript and related other languages; this Brox inherits its effectiveness 
and correctness by using inter-procedure analysis framework.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Detecting Leakage Analysis in GPS Applications  
Android is the most widely used Mobile operating system on many smartphones. 
There are many information flow tracking and information leakage detection 
techniques that are developed on Android operating system.  
The most commonly used technique is Taint analysis. This Taint Analysis is a 
data flow analysis technique, which tracks the flow of private or sensitive GPS 
information and its leakage.  
There are varieties of apps available for different platforms and device 
configurations. Apps are made for PC users and also available for Mobile users. 
These android apps manipulate personal data such as contact and SMS, GPS 
information and leakage of such sensitive information may cause great loss to the 
android users.  
Therefore, detecting sensitive GPS information leakage on Android is in urgent 
need. However, till now, there is still no complete perfect solution available to get 
rid of this scenario to Android markets. 
A famous approach called State-of-the-art is used for detecting Android GPS 
information leakage by applying dynamic analysis on user site, thus they introduce 
large runtime overhead to the Android GPS apps.  
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The main major difference between both the cases is, static analysis techniques 
look at the complete program source code and all possible paths of execution 
before its run, whereas dynamic analysis looks at the instructions executed in the 
program-run in the real time.  
 
Approaches 
There are many different approaches proposed to detect and determine the leakage 
of GPS data in an android device. This detection analysis can be done in two 
different ways. By static analysis and dynamic analysis. Few of the detections 
techniques are proposed below:  
 
4.1 LeakMiner - A Static Taint Analysis 
There are different approaches available to detect the leakage in android 
applications[37]. LeakMiner is one among them, which detects leakage of 
sensitive GPS information on Android with a static taint analysis. LeakMiner 
analyzes Android apps on market site unlike Dynamic analysis. 
Therefore it does not introduce any runtime overhead to normal execution of target 
applications on a device. Besides, this LeakMiner technique can detect sensitive 
information leakage before apps are available to users, so vulnerable apps can be 
identified and removed from play store before users download them.  
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Fig 10: Overall Architecture of LeakMiner[38] 
 
The above figure 10 explains the overall architecture[38] of LeakMiner technique, 
which is a static analysis for detecting the data leakage in android applications. 
Staring with android app and it traverses in a reverse manner and produces the 
Leak report. 
  
Functionality  
Unlike others programs, Android apps[46] doesn‘t contain the main function, 
which is usually named the root or main function in C/C++ or Java. Instead of 
consisting single entry point, Android apps may have multiple entry points. These 
entry points are pre-defined by service interfaces and Android activity.  
Our static taint analysis technique first build call graphs[59] which starts at these 
one of the entry points. Then a new root function node is used to link these call 
31 
 
graphs by constructing function call edges from the root node to each of the entry 
nodes. The entry points that were traced by static taint analysis are listed below: 
 
4.1.1 Fundamental activity lifecycle callbacks 
Android provides six basic lifecycle callbacks that are onCreate, onStart, 
onResume, onPause, onStop, and onDestroy. User can override any of this 
callback through any Android activity to do an appropriate work. These are the 
hooks that are invoked by Android activity manager when the state of activity 
changes. These callback functions are fundamental activity entry points for every 
android app.  
 
4.1.2 Activity supplementary callbacks 
Fundamental activity[46] lifecycle callbacks are triggered each time when the state 
of activity is changed. Besides, Android provides supplementary hooks, which 
assist the function of Android system for efficient resource management. 
For example, when the system destroys or kills an activity in order to restore 
memory, a function onSaveInstanceState is invoked to save the current state of 
activity. A corresponding onRestoreInstanceState hook is invoked to restore the 
state when user navigates to the activity.  
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4.1.3 Basic service lifecycle callbacks 
Like activities, Android services also have life callbacks, which are automatically 
triggered by android service manager such as onStartCommand, onBind, 
onCreate, and onDestroy[46]. These callback services are the basic entry points 
for analyzing the service application behaviors.  
 
4.1.4 Service supplementary callbacks 
This Service supplementary callbacks are usually triggered when the configuration 
is altered (eg. onConfigurationChanged), or when the resources are exploited (eg. 
onLowMemory).  
  
Leakage Source LeakMiner 
Report 
True Leak age 
Device ID 278 127 
Phone Information 53 50 
Location 35 27 
Contacts 12 12 
Total Detected 305 145 
 
Table 2: Information leakage reported by leakminer about half of the reported 
informaton leakage is true information leakage.[46] 
 
33 
 
These functions are infrequently triggered, and our analysis includes such 
interfaces for the sake of code coverage. The above table 2 explains the 
information leakage reported by LeakMiner in which about half of the reported 
information leakage is true information leakage. 
 
4.2 TaintDroid – a Dynamic Taint approach 
TaintDroid is a dynamic taint tracking[39] system for Android devices available 
system-wide. Simultaneously, this TaintDroid[65] approach can track multiple 
sources and sinks. When the sensitive information leaks through the system at the 
run time, the Android phone users are get notified.  
 
Fig 11: TaintDroid within the Android Application[60] 
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The above figure 11 explains the TainDroid structure[40] in an android 
application. The main functionality of TaintDroid is achieved by altering the 
Dalvik virtual machine of Android. It introduces variable level taint tracking in 
android system using the shadow variables.  
The size of each variable is doubled from 32 bits to 64 bits with modifying the 
stack format. These additional 32 bits are used to store the taint tag ID. These taint 
tag ID‘s are the unique identifiers to identify the sensitive information such as 
Geographical Location coordinates and IMEI.   
This TaintDroid offers various levels of tracking in android system. It does 
variable level tracking for the native code in the system. For the secondary storage 
files it does File level tracking. 
 It does the message level tracking for the Inter Process Communications and 
finally it does the method level tracking for the native code.The taint tags are 
added to the sources in the taint system and when it reaches the sinks in taint 
system, these tags are processed to recognize and find out which information is 
leaked through at the corresponding sink.  
Each application in android environment has their own sandbox with its own User 
ID, Dalvik Virtual Machine instance and respective set of permissions assigned to 
it.  
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In a trusted application the Taint source is marked, which is mapped in virtual 
taint map by the new or modified Dalvik virtual machine. The Binder IPC is 
responsible for the inter-app communication and that carries the tainted data to 
binder hook of untrusted app. 
This tainted data is then mapped and propagated in corresponding virtual taint 
map. This virtual map is of untrusted application according to data flow rules. 
When the untrusted application triggers a taint sink specified library, the particular 
tag from the tainted data is retrieved and the event is reported directly to user. 
 This TaintDroid technique tracks information flows at real-time for the privacy 
monitoring. TaintDroid has 14% performance overhead on a CPU bound micro-
benchmark.  
TheTaintDroid implementation requires constructing a ROM i.e., patched version 
of Android operating system in a customized android release. CyanogenMod 
ROM is an OS similar to Android available in market. This CyanogenMod ROM‘s 
has been released in some of the Samsung Galaxy devices.  
This TaintDroid has been integrated with this CyanogenMod ROM. There is a 
successful author who presented collection of attacks on TaintDroid exploring its 
effectiveness and limitations. The author applied generic classes of anti-taint 
methods to overcome TaintDroid.  
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Approach Static/Dynamic Analysis Sensitive 
information 
Sources defined 
Implicit 
flows 
Taint Droid Dynamic Analysis 5 sources 32 
possible 
Method level 
tracking 
AppFence[41] Dynamic Analysis 12 sources 
predefined 
Not analyzed 
Kynoid[42] Dynamic Analysis 2
32 
possible Not analyzed 
LeakMiner Static Analysis 6 sources 
predefined 
Not analyzed 
TrustDroid[43] Static Analysis Not mentioned  Not analyzed 
FlowDroid[44] Static Analysis Exhaustive list Analyzed[45] 
  
Table 3: comparison of various Taint Analysis Techniques for android[37] 
 
 
Table 4: comparison of various Taint Analysis Techniques for android with other 
techniques[37] 
 
 
 Inter app 
Taint 
Propagation 
(IPC) 
Deployment Open Source availability 
Taint Droid Message level 
taint tracking 
Customized 
Android version 
Available 
AppFence Not mentioned Customized 
Android version 
Available 
Kynoid Inter Process 
Tracking 
Customized 
Android version 
Not available 
LeakMiner Not analyzed Deployed on 
computer 
Not available 
TrustDroid Not analyzed Can be deployed 
on computer as 
well as phone 
Not available 
FlowDroid Not analyzed Deployed on 
computer 
Available 
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The above tables 3 and 4 explain comparison of various Taint Analysis[62] 
Techniques for android with other techniques. Among all the approaches from 
table 3 only the TaintDroid approach follows the Method level tracking and all 
other approaches are not analyzed. From table 4 only the TaintDroid approach and 
AppFence approach has the open source availability. 
From table 4, all the approaches including the TaintDroid can be deployed in a 
customized android version whereas the FlowDroid approach is deployed on 
computer instead of mobile phone.  
 
4.3 Detection Leakage through Hybrid Analysis 
Hybrid analysis is the combination of both static and dynamic analysis to enhance 
the privacy leak detection. The overview of hybrid privacy[72] detection tool 
known as SmartDroid[66] is shown in the below figure. The leak dete ction of 
SmartDroid varies at different levels of the application.  
At the higher levels it implements a static path selector that uses static analysis to 
extract the expected activity of switching paths by analyzing function CFGs and 
activity.  
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Fig 12: SmartDroid Architecture[66] 
  
The above figure 12 explains the SmartDroid Architecture for an android 
application. Then the dynamic UI[67] is invoked and then traversed each UI 
element. This is done to reveal privacy sensitive trigger conditions according to 
the static analysis reports[68] i.e., activities and switching paths. 
 
4.4 Detection Leakage through Cloud based analysis  
All the mobile devices have limited memory and are severely restricted in 
resources. Due to this performing the privacy leak detection on these devices is an 
issue. So, the researchers came up with a solution and proposed a new cloud based 
analysis model[71]. 
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Fig 13: Paranoid Android Architecture[71]  
 
The above figure 13 explains the structure of Paranoid Android Architecture[49] 
in an android device. Architecture of one such technique and tool names Paranoid 
android was proposed.  
Based on this model[73], performing privacy detection on mobile devices has been 
eliminated. The architecture is illustrated in the above figure. The working of this 
model is, the cloud[69] includes running synchronized replica of the mobile device 
on a cloud-based server. 
Since the server does not have any memory and mobile device like constraints, the 
privacy leak detection analysis that would be too complex to run on a mobile 
device can be performed successfully. In this model there is a Tracer available in 
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mobile device that collects all the necessary information required to perform all 
the mobile application executions. 
This tracer transmits the information over the encrypted channel to the cloudbased 
Replayer[70]. It re-executes the application in the smart phone emulator. Then 
eventually the privacy checks within the emulator can be performed on the server.  
 
4.5 Leak Detection through Kynoid 
Recently Daniel Schreckling proposed Kynoid[42], which is real time enforcement 
of fine-grained, user defined and datacentric security policy proposed in android. 
It is based on user defined security policies defined for data items stored in shared 
resources. Core idea of Kynoid is to implement a middleware between application 
and the data as shown in Fig to provide policy enforcement functionality. 
        
Fig 14: Core idea of Kynoid[61] 
 
The above figure 14 explains the core idea of Kynoid in android architecture. 
Kynoid is based on TaintDroid to integrate a lightweight policy tracker in 
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sandboxing mechanism of Android[42]. It tries to make the TaintDroid approach 
fine grained to support practical permission system, which allows critical and non-
critical data. 
 
 TaintDroid supports 32 different tags in 32 bits field introduced in shadow 
variable, which can refer to at most 32 different data sources. Whereas, Kynoid 
uses this 32 bits field for identifiers, each variable in Android can be assigned with 
different ID, which again mapped with policy.  
 
It allows Kynoid finer grained tracking by having total 2
32
 mappings for security 
policies. But this creates tremendous amount of run time and memory overhead, 
which is addressed by using dependency graph in Kynoid. 
 
Dependency graph is evaluated at sink to derive exact security policy. Kynoid 
blocks the connections that are leaking information at monitored sinks as per 
policies defined. Modifying this Dalvik VM for taint tracking and Kynoid system 
service for policy database and ID mapping does implementation. 
 
For inter-process policy tracking, identifiers of source variables are mapped to the 
identifiers of destination variable of another app. Sinks are monitored in similar 
kind of architecture that of TaintDroid to detect information leak.  
 
Kynoid claims to be giving competitive performance on benchmark tests against 
TaintDroid while providing finer granularity of taint tracking policy, but it exists 
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only as a prototype implementation. Also, Kynoid needs to analyze impact of 
indirect flows to the overall performance. 
 
 
4.6 DroidVulMon 
 
In android the security-related vulnerability for mobile terminal suggests 
‗DroidVulMon‘ system to detect and respond attacks in order to prevent 
information leakage caused by malicious app. 
  
The proposed scheme is different from the traditional scheme in the sense that the 
proposed scheme enables to monitor and detect existence of malicious app for 
multiple terminals while the traditional scheme supports to detect malicious app 
for only one mobile terminal.  
  
The proposed scheme, named as DroidVulMon, enables to collect information 
related to system, service, process and network from multiple terminals so that it 
can detect rooting attacks and security vulnerability. 
 
4.6.1 Security Architecture for malicious App detection  
The Architecture about the proposed system, DroidVulMon[47] can be described 
as a follow Fig. One of main part is a server which consists of server application 
and vulnerability checking server. Vulnerability checking server is continuously 
cooperating with client.  
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Specifically, the security vulnerability-checking engine of vulnerability server 
sends or receives data from security vulnerability monitoring engine in client. 
They exchange data including engine update information and manage verification 
logic with each other.  
 
Additionally, the server has security-checking DB, which is used for storing the 
entire data to/from server and the data maintained in DB will be utilized for 
criteria to estimate whether an app is malicious app or not. As mentioned above, 
client has vulnerability monitoring engine.  
 
 
      
Figure 15: System Architecture[47] 
 
 
The above figure 15 explains the system architecture of DroidVulMon[47] for an 
android application. The main purpose of the engine is to verify and protect the 
app in conjunction with server's vulnerability check engine. If the malicious app is  
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DroidVulMon aims to detect malicious app and security related vulnerability for 
‗n‘ mobile terminals. To meet this goal, the DroidVulMon is designed effectively 
to share data collected from n mobile terminal by client and server. 
  
The main purpose of the engine is to authenticate and protect the app in 
conjunction with server's vulnerability check engine. If the malicious app is 
detected, events will be collected.  
Those events will be sent to a native library, which is an agent to detect rooting 
attack and the native library along with main program keep sharing events, rooting 
attack monitoring results and information about abnormal app. 
4.7 Overall Comparison 
The below table 5-I/II explains the comparison of different types of Detection 
analyses. All the techniques are applied on Android platform except the 
ProtectMyPrivacy technique, which is for iOS device. Static data flow technique is 
implemented by most of the approaches like LeakMiner, AndroidLeaks, 
AppIntent. Whereas Droidtest, IntentFuzzer and TISSA use dynamic data flow 
technique. 
Majority of android apps are tested on AndroidLeaks approach, which is around 
25,976. Approximately 57,299 leaks are found in applications; 63.51% leaks are 
found in ad code. Moreover, 92% leaks are related to phone data, 5.94% leaks are 
of Location data. 
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Table 5: Privacy Leak Detection Framework-I[71] 
  
 
 
Tools/ 
Frameworks 
Platform Technique No. of Tested Apps 
LeakMiner Android Static Flow Data 1,750 
PCLeaks Android Static intra Component 
analysis 
2,000 
DroidTest Android Dynamic Data Flow 50 
AndroidLeaks Android Static Data Flow 25,976 
AppIntent Android Static data Flow 1,000 
IntentFuzzer Android Dynamic capability leak 2,183 
IccTA Android Static intra component 
Analysis 
3,000 
TISSA Android Dynamic data flow 24 
Mobile Forensics 
of Privacy Leaks 
Android Correlate User actions to 
leaks 
226 
Woodpecker Android Capability Leaks 953 
ProtectMyPrivacy iOS Crowdsourcing 685 
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 Summary 
LeakMiner It is found that 127 app leaks device ID, 50 apps leaks phone info, 27 
apps leaks Location and 12 apps leaks contacts. 
PCLeaks Nearly 986 component leaks are found. While 534-activity launch 
leaks are found. Moreover, broadcast injection leaks are 245 and 
activity-hijacking leaks are 110. 
DroidTest It is found that most app leaks model number, subscriber ID, 
Location, Mobile number 
AndroidLeaks Approximately 57,299 leaks are found in applications; 63.51% leaks 
are found in ad code. Moreover, 92% leaks are related to phone data, 
5.94% leaks are of Location data. 
AppIntent It is found that 140 apps have potential data leaks, 26 apps leaks data 
unintentionally, 24 apps leaks Location, 1 app leaks SMS 
IntentFuzzer It is found that more than 50% of applications leak capabilities or 
permissions related to network state, Location, internet connection 
IccTA It is found that 425 applications leak information directly. These 
leaks are related to Device and Location data 
TISSA It is found that 14 apps leak Location and 13 leaks device ID. 
Mobile Forensics of 
Privacy Leaks 
It is found that 9 different kinds of data is leaked by applications, 34 
apps leaks data due to user actions on widgets 14 leak on Location. 
Woodpecker Explicit capability leaks are found in trustworthy applications. 
ProtectMyPrivacy It is found that 48.43% applications access identifier of device, 
13.27%access locations, 1 app leaks contacts. 
 
Table 6: Privacy Leak Detection Framework-II [71] 
 
The above table 5-I explains the statistics and comparison of different types of 
Detection analyses Least number of apps was tested on TISSA and DroidTest 
approaches, which are 24 and 50 apps respectively.  
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It is found that 14 apps leak Location and 13 leaks device ID through the TISSA 
approach whereas it is found that most app leaks model number, subscriber ID, 
Location, Mobile number through the DroidTest approach.  
Dynamic capability leak technique is applied on IntentFuzzer and number of apps 
tested was 2,183. It is found that more than 50% of applications leak capabilities 
or permissions related to network state, Location, internet connection. 
Capability Leaks are applied on Woodpecker testing in total 953 apps. Explicit 
capability leaks are found in trustworthy applications. Crowdsourcing is applied 
on ProtectMyPrivacy is tested on 685 number of applications. It is found that 
48.43% applications access identifier of device, 13.27%access locations, app leaks 
contacts. 
Static intra component Analysis is applied on IccTA testing on 3000 apps. It is 
found that 425 applications leak information directly. These leaks are related to 
Device and Location data.  
Static intra Component analysis is applied on PCLeaks with tested on 2000 apps. 
Nearly 986 component leaks are found. While 534-activity launch leaks are found. 
Moreover, broadcast injection leaks are 245 and activity-hijacking leaks are 110. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Android App – Track Me 
  
5.1 Location Tracking Applications 
In this chapter, we discuss about apps that records the GPS coordinates and shares 
them to the dear ones. There are bunch of applications available in play store, 
which works on these GPS.  
 
The below table 6 gives the comparison between the Location sharing apps 
available in the app store. The table compares the apps with the type of language 
developed, type of webserver used and databases. The table also talks about the 
pros and cons of the apps.  
  
All the apps developed on Android uses either Java or C# as programming 
languages for development. Usually most of the apps are developed on Java 
because development on Java is more feasible. Java doesn‘t less configuration 
system for development.   
 
A common database used for app development in android is SQLite. By the 
nomenclature it conveys as a Lite database. It‘s not like a usual database. Since 
mobile has very less memory when compared to the desktop applications.  
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Table 7: Comparison of different Location sharing apps on app store 
  
5.2 Case Study 
Sygic GPS Application 
The Sygic GPS application[50] allows the users to take pictures using an Activity 
developed in house, instead of reusing the regular Android camera application.  
 
 
       
Family Locator 
Friend 
Location 
Finder 
 
Friend Finder 
 
 
Family Locator 
 
Friends Finder 
Database 
 
SQLite[51] SQLite H2 DB SQLite SQLite 
Language Java Java  C# Java Java 
Webserver GCM Http[52] GCM Http GCM Http GCM Http GCM Http 
Pros and 
cons 
 
Pros:  
Networking app 
which also 
includes:  
1.Location 
Sharing 
2.Circle 
3.Places 
4.Premium 
Cons:  
1.Needs Internet 
compulsory on 
phone to track. 
2.Need 
Smartphone 
 
Pros: 
Shares 
device ID to 
establish 
connection 
and receives 
location 
updates. 
 
Cons: 
1.Needs 
Internet 
compulsory 
to track. 
2.Need 
Smartphone 
 
 
Pros: 
Very perfect 
& accurate in 
giving the 
location 
updates. 
Cons:  
1.App can 
only send 
updates to 2 
contacts 
which is 
limited. 
2.Not on iOS, 
need Internet 
to run this 
application. 
Need 
Smartphone 
Pros:  
Networking 
app which 
also includes:  
1.Location 
Sharing 
2.Circle 
3.Message 
sharing 
Cons: 
1.Need 
Internet to run 
this 
application. 
2.Need 
Smartphone. 
 
 
Cons: 
1.Need 
Internet to run 
this 
application. 
2.Need 
smartphone. 
3.Difficult to 
understand 
the Interface 
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To do this, the Activity called CameraActivity first registers a callback using the 
Camera.takePicture function. The system triggers the callback function when the 
picture is captured and attaches the actual byte array. It then calls setResult 
function and finish, sending the raw picture to the caller.  
The Activity has no intent-filter because the exported attribute is not set, the 
default value is set to false. The Activity could only be exploited by another 
application signed by the same developer, so then we classify it as low risk.  
As of now, none of the other applications of the same developer currently in the 
play store seem to invoke this Activity function, but this may change in the future. 
This type of vulnerability is difficult to detect statically because the source is not 
in the application code. The application passes a function to the camera API and 
the operating system calls that function with tainted parameters.  
The Intent passes through a message queue, from where it is forwarded to the 
correct application handler. Identification of this vulnerability was possible 
because we analyze the application together with the Android libraries and 
manually added a rule to Permission Flow that marks the function that distributes 
the Intents to handlers as having a tainted Intent parameter.  
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5.3 Personalized Android app – Track Me 
This section discuss about an android app that is developed and entitled ―Track 
Me‖ records your Geographical Longitudinal and Latitudinal location coordinates 
from the app using the GPS[54].  
  
Initially, the app has to set a mobile number to someone whom you want to share 
your location coordinates. And then once the app is triggered, it sends the GPS 
coordinates to that corresponding mobile number through the app[53].  
 
Functionality 
The app sends geographical coordinates along with the address and a Google 
Maps link[54]. So, the app users may need not to have a smart phone on both 
sides. It works perfectly even if only the sender has a smartphone and the receiver 
does not have one.  
 
This app keeps on send the geographical coordinates to the receiver in the form of 
text message for every constant interval of time. Once the app is triggered, it keeps 
running in the background and sends the text message to the receiver until we hit 
the stop command in the app. 
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5.3.1 Home Screen  
Initially, the app is supported for only android devices. The device requires 
minimum OS Android 2.2 running on android devices.    
 
 
Fig 16: Home Screen of app 
 
The above figure 16 is the welcome screen for the app. Whenever the user triggers 
the app from the device, this screen pops up asking to start newly or continue to 
send the text messages to the previous number that has been set on the device. 
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Either you can select ―Go to Application‖ or ―Yes‖. If the user hits the ―Go to 
Application‖ button then the app, it redirects to the new contact page to add a new 
contact number to which the geographical coordinates updates are to be sent.  
  
5.3.2 Go to Application 
 
Fig 17: Go to Application 
 
The above figure 17 shows a screen that pops up when the user hits the ―Go to 
Application‖ button during the welcome screen. If the user wants to set a new 
number to which the coordinates has to be sent then hits the contacts button.  
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5.3.3 Contacts  
 
 
Fig 18: Adding a Contact 
 
The above figure 18 shows a screen to add a new contact to whom the user wants 
to send the updates of his/her location. A new contact can be added or an existing 
contact can be chosen.  
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5.3.4 Choosing a Contact 
 
 
Fig 19: Choosing a Contact 
 
 
The above figure shows a screen to pick a contact from the phone directory to 
whom the user has to share the location coordinates and after choosing the contact, 
the user hits back button to return to Main menu. 
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5.3.5 Start Updating 
 
 
Fig 20: Start Updating 
 
The above figure 20 shows a screen saying the location updating has been started 
and it keeps sends the text messages to the number, which we have set in the app. 
The app keeps on send text messages to the receiver for every two minutes of 
interval. 
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5.3.6 Text Message Notification 
 
 
Fig 21: Text Message Notification to receiver 
 
The above figure 21 shows a format of the text notification[53] sent to the receiver 
when the app is triggered from the sender mobile. The message contains a link 
which when pressed redirects to the exact location on the Google Maps.  
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5.3.7 Google Map View 
 
 
Fig 22: Google Map View 
 
The above figure 22 shows a screen, which is redirected, to the Google Maps[54] 
when the link in the text message [53] is pressed. By default the app navigates to 
the Google Maps and pins your exact location.  
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CHAPTER-6  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURE APPLICATIONS  
The best and efficient advice for security-aware Android developers is to pay close 
attention to the configuration of their application (particularly, any combination of 
parameters listed without additional checks, vulnerable). If such a parameter 
combination is needed for functionality reuse or other constraints, here are some 
ways of maintaining security:  
A better approach is to always request an explicit user confirmation for the 
invocation of any Activity that may be part of an inter-application flow and the 
user should be informed to which caller the information will be sent.  
This method has the disadvantage that it decreases the ease-of-use of the 
application and to enforce that callers of your Activities own certain permissions, 
developers can use either declarative permission requirements in the application 
manifest and dynamic permission checks using checkPermission calls.  
All the developers should consider using work-around for sending sensitive 
information over inter-component boundaries. For example, several of the 
applications analyzed leak information from an ordered set of items such as GPS 
data, contact names/phone number or zip code.  
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For these kind of applications there is no need for complex mechanisms to 
avoiding the vulnerability. It may be sufficient to return an integer index to the 
information database, instead of the actual information and the caller would need 
to query the database to obtain the actual information.  
Passing sensitive information over the inter-component boundaries of the same 
application in an encrypted form is recommended to protect against unintended 
callers, but it does not help if an attacker has compromised another application 
with which the current application shares the user id.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Many android applications have access to other types of sensitive information 
that are not protected by standard Android permissions. In order to protect 
this kind of information, developers should define custom permissions to the 
apps, but because of the coarse-grained nature of the custom permissions 
(assigned to applications as opposed to APIs) it is not possible to 
automatically identify the taint sources for such information. The method is 
completely automated and it is based on coupling rule-based static taint 
analysis with automatic generation[63] of rules that specify how permissions 
can leak to unauthorized applications. Most mobile operating systems are 
included in this category and can benefit from the proposed new application 
of taint analysis[64]. 
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